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Abstract
In this paper, I respond to comments by Henggeler, Schoenwald, Borduin, and Swenson
(this issue) on my recent article, “Lessons from a systematic review of Multisystemic Therapy.” I
identify factual and logical errors in their response, show how relevant research has been
misinterpreted and misrepresented, and suggest constructive new directions for Multisystemic
Therapy and the evidence-based practice movement.
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Introduction
Sometimes science matters. New evidence or a new look at old evidence can disconfirm
even hallowed assumptions. It is thus entirely reasonable to question whether evidence for the
effectiveness of Multisystemic Therapy (MST) holds up under close scrutiny. Such an appraisal
is warranted especially when rigorous, empirically-based techniques of research synthesis might
usefully revise findings of earlier narrative reviews. In “Lessons from a systematic review of
Multisystemic Therapy” (Children and Youth Services Review, 27, 445-463), I indicated that the
effectiveness of MST remains in doubt. The effectiveness of MST was not the main subject of
that article, however. In the “Lessons” article, I identified wide gaps between the science and
practice of research synthesis and argued for enhanced rigor in the conduct, reporting, and
synthesis of controlled trials. To illustrate my case, I used examples from my research team’s
systematic review and meta-analysis of controlled studies on the effects of Multisystemic
Therapy, but as its title suggests the “Lessons” article was not intended to be a full account of
that systematic review (for a full report, see Littell, Popa, & Forsythe, 2005).
Scott Henggeler, Sonja Schoenwald, Charles Borduin, and Cynthia Swenson chose to
respond to selected portions of “Lessons” in “The Littell paper: Methodological critique and
meta-analysis as Trojan Horse” (this issue). My purpose in the present paper is to identify and
correct the factual and logical errors in their response, and to suggest constructive directions for
MST and the evidence-based practice movement.
But it is important to consider first the context of this debate.
Dr. Henggeler and his coauthors are the developers of MST. They also served as
principal investigators on the major federal grants used to test this intervention. By 2003,
research grants for MST totaled $35 million (Henggeler, 2003). In January 2004, Dr. Henggeler
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(2004a) announced the receipt of approximately $20 million in new research grants. Dr.
Henggeler and his associates direct and hold stock in MST Services, Inc., a private consulting
firm “which has the exclusive licensing agreement… for the dissemination of MST technology
and intellectual property” (Rowland & Halliday-Boykins, 2004, p. 4). MST Services Inc. collects
licensing, training, and consulting fees of approximately $400 to $550 per youth served
(Strengthening Families America, 1999) and serves about 10,000 families per year (Henggeler,
2003).
Quite apart from their hard-won professional pride in their achievements, the developers
of MST have a financial interest in this “model program.” There is nothing intrinsically wrong
with this, but the potential for conflict of interest is obvious and bears watching. As the
developing and marketing of pharmaceuticals has taught us, independent trials and disinterested,
rigorous, systematic reviews of all credible evidence should be essential elements of policy
making for the public good.
I have no personal or financial stake in MST or any other intervention model. I have
never met Dr. Henggeler or any of his colleagues. Contrary to their suggestions, if there is a
“camp” with some “insidious strategy” to “camouflage the commitment to the status quo”
(Henggeler et al., this issue), I have nothing to do with it. I take pride in being a member of the
“disputatious community of ‘truth-seekers’” that Donald Campbell (1988) envisioned. I have no
other agenda, no secret weapons – no Trojan Horse.
Indeed, I share the concerns of Henggeler and his colleagues, and scholars such as
Leonard Bickman (2002), about the lack of evidence for the effectiveness of most services for
children and families – what Henggeler and colleagues called the “cottage industry” of mental
health services. However, it is the “MST industry” that is the subject of this debate. Will the
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MST industry utilize independent evaluations and evidence-based critiques to advance
knowledge and practice on behalf of youth and families, or will it advance a new orthodoxy and
demonstrate the “distrust, fear, and behavior protective of the status quo” of which Henggeler
and his colleagues are so critical?
I return to these broader issues by way of conclusion. Immediately below, I consider
matters of fact and logic.
Factual errors in Henggeler et al.’s response
Contrary to Henggeler et al.’s assertions, I drew no “conclusions” about the effects of
MST in the “Lessons” article. Instead, I characterized preliminary findings as such and noted
that these results might change as new information became available.
The suggestion that my papers were “broadly distributed through the Internet and media”
is false. As a professional courtesy, I sent preliminary results of our systematic review to
Henggeler and his colleagues, independent MST investigators, and reviewers whose work we
cited, noting that this was a draft for comment and discussion only. Like Henggeler, his
colleagues, and other scholars, I actively seek input on my work at scholarly and professional
conferences and I make conference presentations available on request.
The claim that statements in my paper were not “substantiated with data” is false. I
provided Henggeler and colleagues with a full report on our meta-analysis -- and most of the data
in it were generated by them.
The claim that our systematic review was not peer-reviewed is false. After preliminary
results were vetted by stakeholders and experts, and beginning in early January 2005, the final
report was assessed by ten anonymous readers for the Cochrane Collaboration and the Campbell
Collaboration.
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The claim that I “ignored” feedback is false. I provided Henggeler and colleagues with
detailed written responses to their criticisms on October 20, 2003, December 2, 2003, and
February 11, 2005. I disagree with their views of the role of treatment fidelity and site-level
variations in explaining results. These issues are addressed in our Cochrane review (Littell, Popa,
& Forsythe, 2005) and are taken up below. To disagree with others is not to ignore them.
I did not suggest that the MST trials “were not credible” because of variable follow-up
periods (or for any other reason), nor did I imply that the length of follow-ups was “arbitrary” or
“manipulated” (Henggeler et al., this issue). If the studies were not credible, why would we
include them in our review?
I did not ignore “the efficacy and effectiveness results generated in numerous…MST
trials” (Henggeler et al., this issue). These data are included in our systematic review.
My research team did not use a study quality rating system to weight results of our metaanalysis. We did not privilege or elevate results of any study.
Logical errors
Equating the purposes of primary and secondary studies
Henggeler et al. claim that I “did not consider distinctions among purposes” of various
MST trials (this issue). However, they did not recognize that, like any secondary analysis of
data, a systematic review and/or meta-analysis1 may be conducted for purposes other than those
of the primary studies under review. For example, one can examine gender differences using data
from studies that were not originally intended to address this issue. The purposes of my team’s
systematic review were twofold: We aimed to provide unbiased estimates of the overall (i.e.,

1

Here the term “systematic review” means a review of available data that uses explicit inclusion and exclusion
criteria, a systematic strategy to locate all potentially-relevant studies, inter-rater agreement on study inclusion
decisions, and systematic coding and inter-rater agreement on key features of included studies. Meta-analysis refers
to quantitative synthesis of results of multiple studies. Meta-analysis may or may not be part of a systematic review.
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average) effects of MST in controlled studies of outcomes for youth and families and, to the
extent possible, identify sources of heterogeneity (i.e., moderators) of these effects across
studies. For reasons discussed below (and in our systematic review), available data do not
support systematic moderator analysis; thus, it is not possible at present to determine why some
studies reported greater effects than others. All of the studies in our review assessed effects of
MST, and that is sufficient for our primary purpose, which mirrors proponents’ claims that MST
is effective across several service populations and settings (Henggeler, Schoenwald, Rowland, &
Cunningham, 2002).
Post hoc explanations for heterogeneous effects
Any explanation for variations in results across MST studies is purely speculative at this
point. The MST trials differ in terms of their sample characteristics, comparison conditions,
perceived fidelity to MST, investigator independence, and the extent to which they support
intent-to-treat analysis. Any of these factors can be used to explain the fact that results of early
studies conducted by Henggeler and his associates were not replicated in the large, independent,
multi-site Ontario trial (Leschied & Cunningham, 2002); yet we cannot know which factors were
responsible for this difference because plausible sources of heterogeneity are confounded.
Nevertheless, Henggeler and colleagues advanced several post hoc explanations for these
differences, which I consider next.
Efficacy, effectiveness, and transportability
Henggeler (2004b) suggested that results of early MST efficacy trials were more
promising than those of later studies of effectiveness, and MST developers took me to task for
not recognizing this “difference.” However, the distinctions between efficacy and effectiveness
research are not at all clear in the original MST studies. Referring to the original MST trials,
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Schoenwald and colleagues said the designs “could be considered hybrids of ‘efficacy’ and
‘effectiveness’ research” (Schoenwald, Sheidow, Letourneau, & Liao, 2003, p. 234). Post-hoc
distinctions on these matters are debatable. Henggeler and colleagues refer to the Ontario trial as
a transportability study, but according to its investigators, this study was designed to assess
effectiveness and efficiency and it did not include plans for a systematic study of factors that
affect transportability (see Leschied & Cunningham, 2002).
Fidelity
The MST developers claim that their model is implemented more or less faithfully across
sites and therapists, and that greater fidelity to the model predicts more positive outcomes. They
state that “demonstrating treatment fidelity is essential for establishing internal validity, and
internal validity is essential for determining whether the study provides a fair test of the
intervention’s effectiveness” (Henggeler et al., this issue). These claims seem reasonable. The
MST developers use their own Treatment Adherence Measure (TAM) to assess fidelity to their
model. Although the TAM predicts outcomes in some studies, it does not appear to be a valid
measure of fidelity to MST because it taps constructs that are considered essential to any
therapeutic intervention, constructs such as client engagement, therapeutic alliance, and client
satisfaction (sample items are: “The sessions were lively and energetic,” “My family and the
therapist worked together effectively,” “We got much accomplished during the therapy
sessions,” and “The therapist recommended that family members do specific things to solve our
problems;” see www.mstinstitute.org/TAM.htm). To my knowledge, the TAM’s ability to
discriminate between MST and any other intervention has never been tested (TAM scores are not
available for control or comparison cases). Further, factor analyses of TAM scores have
produced different results. Schoenwald, Sheidow, Letourneau, and Liao (2003) found that only
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15 of the 26 TAM items loaded on a single factor. “This factor, labeled ‘Therapist Adherence,’
indexes the mutual engagement of the family and therapist in goal-setting, assessment, and
intervention activities…[and] as such the 15-item factor reflects the distinct, but inter-related
principles of MST” (Schoenwald et al., 2003, p. 228). However, it is unclear whether these
principles are truly distinct from those that guide other interventions; hence, it is unclear whether
the TAM measures fidelity to MST or more general practice principles, and it is unclear whether
studies that use the TAM to measure fidelity to MST truly provide “a fair test of the
intervention’s effectiveness.”
Ontario paid at least $250,000 to MST Services, Inc. for licensing, training, and
consultation to support implementation of MST and achieve fidelity to the model (Leshied &
Cunningham, 2002). After Ontario outcome data were available and in the absence of hard data
on site-level differences in fidelity (TAM scores were not associated with outcomes in Ontario),
MST developers used their own judgments about site-level differences in fidelity in Ontario
(judgments contrary to those of on-site investigators) to argue that fidelity mattered (they said,
“although the quality and quantity of adherence data are largely unknown, the site with
apparently the worst adherence had the worst outcomes,” Henggeler et al., this issue).
Program maturity
Henggeler and colleagues point to evidence of program maturity effects in the Ontario
study and claim that I “ignored” the finding that “MST outcomes improved following the first
year of program operation” (Henggeler et al., this issue). The data show that outcomes for the
first 50 MST cases in the Ontario study were more negative than outcomes for the next 50 cases
(Cunningham, 2002). However, as the Ontario investigators noted, random assignment is less
likely to equalize differences between small groups than between larger ones; cases initially
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assigned to MST had more prior arrests than cases initially assigned to usual services; then, as
more cases were added to the experiment, the MST and usual services groups became equivalent
on baseline measures. Further, the same graph that compares outcomes for the first and second
groups of 50 cases also includes outcomes for a third group of 50 MST cases that was more like
the first group than the second, showing that MST outcomes did not improve consistently with
program maturity (Cunningham, 2002). Finally, there were no changes over time in TAM scores.
Thus, “program maturity effects” can only be inferred if the evidence is used selectively.
Site-level variations
MST developers charge that I failed to investigate site-level variations in effects. As an
anonymous reader observed, “Examining ‘site effects’ seems counter to the notion of a metaanalysis, which is designed to aggregate the findings of all available research.” Still, if there is a
sufficient number of sites and systematic variation on factors that may explain differences in
effect sizes, then subgroup and moderator analyses can be conducted to explore possible sources
of heterogeneity of effects. Of the eight experiments in our systematic review, three were
conducted in multiple sites. Two of the three multi-site studies did not report site-level data. The
Ontario study reported interim results by site; however, contrary to the MST developers’ claim
that one of the four Ontario sites “demonstrated clearly favorable outcomes for MST”
(Henggeler et al., this issue), there were no significant between-group differences on any
outcome measure in any site in Ontario. MST cases performed better on about half of the
outcome measures and usual services cases performed better on the other half, but none of these
differences were statistically significant (Leshied & Cunningham, 2002).
The Ontario site-level data that Henggeler and colleagues referred to (this issue) reflect
(1) improvements over time (pre-post differences) in MST cases on certain outcomes and (2)
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between-site differences in MST cases. Both comparisons are misleading and are based on faulty
inferences. First, while MST cases tend to improve over time, so do comparison cases; in some
sites, some pre-post differences are significant for MST cases but not controls. This could be due
to statistical regression (MST cases had lower baseline scores on these measures) or other
factors. In any case, it is certainly not correct to interpret within-group changes over time as
evidence of intervention effects. Second, regarding cross-site comparisons, it is true that
recidivism rates for MST cases were lower in some sites than in others, but the same pattern
holds for comparison cases in those sites. The difference in recidivism rates across sites is not
evidence of intervention effects.
The use of this kind of evidence to “provide a more balanced view of the Canadian
findings” (Henggeler et al., this issue) is quite troubling. It ignores the proper contrasts (between
treatment and comparison conditions) that were made possible by a randomized design and are
necessary to support causal inferences (cf. Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002).
Selective use of evidence
Henggeler and colleagues claim that “across sites, MST programs averaged a 10%
reduction in convictions” (this issue) in Ontario. This appears to be based on interim 6-month
follow-up data, which appear in the same table with other interim data that show that MST was
associated with increases in the proportion of youth convicted of any offense at the one-year,
two-year, and three-year follow-ups (none of the differences were statistically significant;
Cunningham, 2002, Table 6). Moreover, data on the full sample (n = 409) confirm the interim
finding that MST was associated with an increase in the proportion of youth convicted of an
offense at the one-year follow-up (convictions occurred in 47% of MST cases and 42% of
comparison cases; again, the difference was not statistically significant; see Littell et al., 2005).
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Integrity of the MST Trials
Inconsistent reports and missing cases
The “Lessons” article provides an example of inconsistent reporting on the number of
cases in MST trials. Due to a word processing error (which I alerted editors to before the article
went to press), a key reference to a 1991 article was missing and is supplied below. As reported
in my article, the first published report on the Missouri Delinquency Project indicated that the
study included 210 families:
A total of 210 families of juvenile offenders agreed to participate in the assessment and
treatment components of the study. Following the initial assessment session, each family
was randomly assigned to either multisystemic therapy or the alternative treatment group.
Approximately 84% (n=88) of the families in multisystemic therapy and 65% (n=68) of
the families assigned to alternative therapy completed treatment (Borduin & Henggeler,
1990, p. 76).
According to the next report (the missing 1991 reference),
Following a pretreatment assessment session, adolescent offenders were randomly
assigned to either MST (n = 100) or IC (n = 100)…Twenty-four (12%) of the families
subsequently refused to enter treatment (Henggeler, Borduin, Melton, Mann, Smith, Hall
et al., 1991, p. 45).
Then in 1995 and following reports, authors reported that 200 cases were assessed, but only 176
were randomly assigned (Borduin, Mann, Cone, Henggeler, Fucci, Blaske, et al., 1995, p. 570;
Henggeler, Cunningham, Pickrel, Schoenwald & Brondino, 1996, p. 52). Henggeler et al.’s claim
that I misread their 1995 paper is inaccurate (they said that I “failed to recognize that families
who refused to participate in treatment (n = 24) were never randomized…,” Henggeler et al., this
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issue). This doesn’t change (or even address) the fact that they provided three different accounts
of the number of cases that were randomized in this study in three published papers. The
distinction between consent to treatment and consent to participate in research (to which they
appeal for explanation) is not the issue, nor is my reading comprehension at fault; the problem is
that their accounts are inconsistent. If, as they claim, the first figure (210) was an “error,” was
the second number (200) wrong as well? It would be useful to know how this happened (as one
Cochrane reader asked, how do investigators lose or miscount 16% (34/210) of the cases in an
experiment?). Moreover, this is not the only MST trial in which this happened.
In a 1992 report on the Family and Neighborhood Services (FANS) study (also known as
the Simpsonville project), the authors said,
Ninety-six juvenile offenders were referred to the FANS project…Twelve youths were
excluded from the research portion of this study for the following reasons: The youth did
not have a felony arrest (n = 2), MST was never implemented (n = 6; families moved or
refused to participate), random assignment was violated (n = 2; MST was court ordered),
or recidivism data were not available on the state’s computerized system (n = 2)
(Henggeler, Melton, & Smith, 1992, p. 954).
Thus, at least two and perhaps as many as twelve cases were excluded after random assignment.
However, subsequent reports described this study as a randomized experiment with 84 cases with
no mention of the 12 excluded cases (e.g., “84 serious juvenile offenders…were referred by the
Department of Youth Services…Youths were randomly assigned to usual services (n=41)…or
MST (n=43);” Henggeler, Cunningham, Pickrel, Schoenwald, & Brondino, 1996, p. 50; see also
Henggeler, Melton, Smith, Schoenwald, & Hanley, 1993, pp. 286-287). The problem is that we
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never get a full and consistent account of how many cases were randomly assigned to groups.
Similar problems occurred in two other MST trials (for details, see Littell et al., 2005).
MST trials are not the only studies in which investigators have eliminated certain cases, a
dubious practice which Dennis Gorman termed “post hoc sample refinement” (Gorman, 2005).
Unyoked designs
In at least one of the MST trials, cases were referred in pairs that were randomly assigned
to MST or a comparison group (“Eligible youths were referred by the DYS in yoked pairs, with
one youth randomly assigned by the Department of Mental Health to receive MST and the other
to receive the usual services,” Henggeler, Melton, & Smith, 1992 p. 954). In other trials, “yoked”
pairs appear to have been formed after random assignment. In both situations, whenever one case
was lost during the study, its mate was retained in the analysis. We consulted two eminent
scholars on the integrity of such “unyoked” designs. One expressed the view that this practice
undermined the original randomized design, and such studies should be dropped from our
analysis. The other thought the retention of unyoked cases made studies vulnerable to the
“invidious bias” that drop-outs may produce, and indicated that it would be prudent for the
investigators to conduct and report sensitivity analysis to determine whether dropping one or
both members of a yoked pair mattered. On September 19, 2003, I asked Dr. Henggeler if it
would be possible (for his colleagues or my team) to extract the unyoked cases and re-run
analyses of program effects. He responded by saying that he did not think unyoked designs posed
a threat to internal validity (Scott Henggeler, personal communication, September 19, 2003). He
may be correct, but a sensitivity analysis would have settled the question and might have allowed
us to have greater confidence in the results of these studies.
Unclear randomization procedures
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As documented in our Cochrane review, several MST studies had unclear randomization
procedures. I gave one example (from the MST Diffusion study) in the “Lessons” paper; another
is provided in our systematic review. Again, the published descriptions of trials were not clear.
On October 20, 2003, I asked Dr. Henggeler about the status of 9 MST cases in the Diffusion
study and requested re-analysis of the study data without these cases, if possible, to enhance
confidence in the findings. He did not answer this request.
Unstandardized observation periods
Variable follow-up lengths are quite common in clinical and field trials, and don’t affect
the credibility of a study if the data are analyzed properly. The experiments I’ve conducted all
had variable follow-up lengths, which we handled with survival analysis and by identifying
outcomes within fixed time intervals (e.g., at one-year post random assignment, including only
those cases followed for the entire one-year period). On September 19, 2003, I asked Dr.
Henggeler if his colleagues could provide us with data that would yield fixed-time-interval
observation periods; they did not do this. Again, this would have increased our confidence in the
results of several MST trials.
Subjective definitions of treatment completion
I agree with Henggeler and colleagues’ view that it rarely makes sense to define
treatment completion in terms of an arbitrary number of sessions. That is not the issue. The
question is whether one includes treatment completers and drop-outs in analyses of outcomes.
The inclusion of those who drop out and those who refuse treatment (after random assignment) is
necessary for full intent-to-treat analysis (cf. Shadish, Cook & Campbell, 2002). If drop-outs and
refusers are excluded, results are likely to be biased by differential attrition and, as I said before,
“this is not an experimental comparison” (Littell, 2005, p. 456). Indeed, studies have shown that
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MST drop-outs are systematically different from program completers, in that the former have
more negative outcomes (Borduin et al., 1995; Leshied & Cunningham, 2002). The concern I
expressed is that, when one defines “drop-out” as not completing treatment satisfactorily, the
bias may be even more pronounced. In the MDP study, post-treatment assessments of psychosocial functioning are only available for program completers and “an MST completer...was
judged by the therapist and clinical supervisor to have completed treatment successfully”
(Schaeffer, 2000, p. 36).
“Flaws” in the Ontario study
Every study has flaws. The “flaws” that the Ontario investigators acknowledged were
characteristic of virtually all the MST trials in our analysis, including the favorable studies
conducted by the MST developers: Randomization procedures were not well-specified, were not
centralized, and could have been subverted. Post-intervention assessments were not blinded and
could have been biased. Some outcome data were collected by MST therapists. Other outcomes
could have been biased by decision-makers’ knowledge of participants’ involvement in MST or
usual services. Further, the Ontario investigators noted that random assignment does not control
for all possible threats to internal validity (e.g., diffusion, compensatory rivalry).
Acknowledgement of these problems -- common to MST trials -- does not reflect poorly on the
Ontario investigators or the relative quality of their study.
Integrity of the Systematic Review
One of the advantages of a Cochrane or Campbell systematic review is that its procedures
are transparent and extensive efforts are made to minimize bias of any type (including
publication bias, selection bias, allegiance effects, and conflict of interest). The protocol for our
review was published before the review was completed (contrary to MST developers’ claims,
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there were no “foregone conclusions”). Using the Cochrane Collaboration’s RevMan software to
generate meta-analyses and forest plots ensures that the data and analysis are completely
transparent. In the forest plots, readers can literally see each piece of raw data (group means,
standard deviations, valid ns) from each study in the analysis, alongside study-level effect sizes,
the weights that were used and their effects, and the statistical models (random or fixed effects)
used. We compiled additional documentation of the sources of each piece of raw data used in the
meta-analysis.
“Elevating” an unpublished study
I believe the Ontario MST study is unpublished because of its null findings, not its
methods. Publication bias (i.e., the tendency to publish studies that report significant, positive
effects and not those with null or negative findings) affects not just reviewers’ and editors’
decisions, but also authors’ decisions to submit articles for publication (for a thorough discussion
of publication bias in meta-analysis, see Rothstein, Sutton, & Bornstein, in press). The Ontario
MST trial had the most complete intent-to-treat (ITT) analysis of any study in our review -- and
it found no significant differences between MST and usual juvenile justice services in outcomes
in four sites.
Henggeler et al. (this issue) confuse ITT analysis with efficacy and suggest that we
interpreted the Ontario trial as if it were an “efficacy study of the highest order.” That is entirely
incorrect. Nothing was done to privilege data from the Ontario trial in our analysis, nor were
efficacy studies treated differently than effectiveness studies (as indicated above, we consider the
Ontario study an effectiveness trial).
Although we rated MST trials in terms of their relative quality, contrary to Henggeler et
al.’s claim, we did not weight our meta-analysis by study quality ratings. As stated clearly in the
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“Lessons” article, we used inverse variance weights (a standard procedure in meta-analysis; see
Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). Our quality rating scheme was used for interpretive purposes only.
Further, Ontario data were included in only 4 of the 21 analyses in our review; and all
remaining analyses had overall effects that were not significantly different from zero. How, then,
could Ontario be the “lynchpin” in our analysis, as Henggeler et al. claim?
“Idiosyncratic” study quality ratings
There are many tools for rating the methodological quality of controlled trials (Moher,
Jadad, Nichol, Penman, Tugwell, & Walsh, 1995), but there is no consensus on the proper way to
do this. We followed the Cochrane Collaboration’s guidelines, which suggest that reviewers rate
study qualities that (a) capture important variations in the set of studies under review and (b) may
affect inferences that can be drawn from those studies (especially concerning internal validity of
treatment outcome studies; see Alderson, Green & Higgins, 2004). Note that these guidelines
suggest that rating methods should be idiosyncratic (I prefer the term “tailored”) to fit the nature
of the studies under review. If there had been variations in blinded assessment among the studies
in our review, we would have included this feature in our rating schema. If we had included
quasi-experiments, our rating scheme would have been much more complex in order to account
for variations in study design.
“Stacking the deck”
An anonymous external reader suggested that we apply “a discount factor” for studies
conducted by the MST program developers, assuming that allegiance bias or conflict of interest
may have prejudiced those studies. Another anonymous reader suggested that we drop studies
that did not provide transparent accounts of random assignment for all cases (as required in the
CONSORT statement; see www.consort-statement.org). The fact that we did not take these
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suggestions could be construed as a bias in favor of MST. The developers’ claim that we were
biased against MST is simply unfounded.
Generalizability
Although MST has spawned an industry, it is by no means “a proxy for evidencesupported practices in general” (Henggeler et al., this issue). If it turns out that MST is not
consistently effective, this does not imply that other practices are ineffective, nor is “the entire
field” discredited. Results of MST trials are simply not generalizable to other practices -- nor are
they generalizable to MST programs that have not been studied.
War metaphors, ad hominem arguments, and false dichotomies
The response by Henggeler and colleagues takes an alarmist tone by invoking war
metaphors (“camps,” “camouflage,” “attacks,” “strategies,” a “Trojan horse”), indicating that
there is an “insidious strategy” to “discredit” MST and warning that “if MST…is discredited; the
entire field is discredited” (Henggeler et al., this issue). They raise the specter of police-state
strategies (“boot camps, incarceration, residential treatment, zero-tolerance policies, and scared
straight programs”) that may ensue should MST fall. This sets up a fearful, “us against them”
mentality – a false dichotomy. The notion that people are either for or against evidence-based
practice is another false dichotomy.
The MST developers make a number of unwarranted assumptions about other people’s
motives (especially my own) and they introduce ad hominem arguments that have no place in a
serious, scholarly discussion. Ad hominem arguments violate a fundamental principle of science:
Ideas should be judged on their logic and empirical support, not on their sources.
Henggeler and colleagues state that the implications of my “contentions” are two-fold:
the use of empirically supported practices “should be eliminated” and the peer review process
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“should be eliminated.” This is nonsense. The fact that there are flaws in the evidence available
to inform practice and defects in the peer-review process does not logically lead to the
conclusion that we should abandon either. As stated clearly in my article, I believe these
essential elements of knowledge development should be strengthened, not abandoned.
Programs don’t simply “work” or “not work.” Unfortunately, this false dichotomy
underlies many current attempts to categorize human services. The purpose of a Cochrane or
Campbell systematic review is to determine how effective one intervention is compared with
others and (if possible) what factors account for variations in effectiveness. Such reviews can
also inform us about the evidentiary status of interventions and tell us what we know and what
we don’t know in a particular field.
Unscientific appeals to authority
Henggeler and colleagues (this issue) reiterate points that I made about the wide
acceptance of MST in government and professional organizations. Indeed, they supply an
impressive list of official admirers. However, appeals to authority (to status and tradition) do not
settle empirical questions. Because authorities are fallible, the norms of science are explicitly
anti-authoritarian (Campbell, 1988). As I pointed out in “Lessons,” the endorsements of MST by
current authorities derive from less-than-rigorous scrutiny of the evidence. Some endorsements
may flow from the political necessity to give the appearance of sponsoring programs that
“work.”
Premature closure of inquiry
Scientific knowledge is tentative and open to revision. It would be wonderful to find an
intervention that had strong evidence of lasting, beneficial effects for children, youth, and
families. In my view, it is premature to draw firm conclusions about the effectiveness of MST –
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one way or the other. MST developers disagree. In a personal communication, Schoenwald
questioned the value of my team’s review of a treatment that has been “shown to work in
efficacy or small-scale effectiveness trials” (Sonja Schoenwald, personal communication,
November 21, 2003). Perhaps her faith will in the end be consistent with the evidence from
independent trials, but that day has yet to come. Until then, if MST is truly science-based, its
developers should seek falsification of their views by subjecting their predictions to critical tests,
instead of trying to prove that MST “works” and invoking ad hoc explanations for disconfirming
evidence.
Donald Campbell warned that when government asked them what to do, scientists would
respond with assurances far beyond the state of the science and out-of-keeping with the tentative
nature of scientific knowledge. Thus, according to Campbell, science requires a “disputatious
community of ‘truth-seekers’” to keep researchers from falling into the “over advocacy” trap
(Campbell, 1988). In his view, nowhere is this more important than in the field of evaluation
research, where political, personal, financial, and scientific interests can collide.
Summing up
I want to emphasize that the previous discussion does not imply that MST developers are
engaged in dishonest or unethical practices. Their work is part of a culture that promotes
programs that have some evidence of effectiveness. However, this is not consistent with the
properly skeptical social science, envisioned by Donald Campbell.
The assertion that my work is a veiled “attempt to discredit” MST is entirely unfounded.
There is no Trojan Horse here. The issue is: What is the foundation for MST? Is it built on
scientific evidence that is free of allegiance bias? Has it withstood critical-rational assessments?
Is it replicable in independent evaluations? Is it built on selective use of evidence by people who
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developed and profit from one of today’s leading “model programs”? Or has there been some
mixture of science and sleight of hand in the making and successful marketing of MST? Until
results of several independent, controlled trials are available, it is too soon to tell.
Looking back
Ten years ago, I argued that the case for intensive family preservation services (IFPS)
was based largely on assertions and selective use of evidence; that program developers relied on
their own studies and ignored results of larger, more rigorous, independent experiments (Littell,
1995). IFPS advocates decried this argument. Later, an independent, multi-site, federally-funded,
controlled trial found no evidence that IFPS was significantly more effective than usual child
welfare services (Westat, 2002). Unlike IFPS, MST was studied with randomized experiments at
an early phase in its development. This is a significant step forward, and other program
developers should follow the lead of Henggeler and his colleagues in using RCTs to test and
improve interventions. Like IFPS, however, the early MST trials were not as rigorous or credible
as larger, independent trials. In both cases, marketing, widespread use, and heightened
expectations occurred well in advance of dispassionate, critical assessments of all the evidence,
perhaps because these interventions promised a relatively “quick fix” for heretofore unsolved
problems.
Moving forward
The fate of the current evidence-based practice movement may hinge on whether it
becomes a new orthodoxy, founded on selective use of evidence and premature closure of
inquiry, or remains open to critical assessments of evidence, incorporating new evidence, and
revising empirically-based knowledge as needed. As indicated in the “Lessons” article, the
Campbell Collaboration and the Cochrane Collaboration provide a platform for unbiased
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synthesis and ongoing updates of research on intervention effects. If science matters, the MST
developers and anyone interested in using evidence to guide practice and policy should embrace
these efforts.
Before investigators try to “transport” off-the-shelf programs like MST, funders and
consumers should insist on independent evaluations of their effectiveness. Absent this, the rapid
proliferation of interventions, based on a handful of nonindependent trials, may eclipse initiatives
to find even more effective approaches. It is also important to understand mechanisms of
effective intervention (e.g., which components of MST are responsible for variations in
outcomes?), using treatment dismantling strategies.
Finally, as my colleagues and I have said many times before, there may be real
limitations to what can be accomplished with short-term interventions aimed at children and
families, even when we engage them on their own terms and in their own milieus. Absent
adequate and ongoing economic and social supports for families, resources such as affordable
housing and substance abuse treatment, what happens to families when MST goes away? It is
time to develop and test truly ecological intervention models, using place randomized trials
(Boruch, 2005). These interventions can target families, neighborhoods, communities, and the
public policies that affect them. And they can be subject to rigorous scrutiny.
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